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# Manchuria

discussed by

ROY H. AGAKI

T. Z. KOO

JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN

January 23, 1932

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
Incorporated
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
Eighteen East Forty-first Street
New York

New York Luncheon Discussion

Pamphlet No. 79
Series 1931-32
March, 1932

*15c. a copy*

## SPEAKERS' TABLE

S. K. Ratcliffe—*Recently editorial writer, "The New Statesman," London*

Tetsuo Scott Miyakawa—*Formerly active in various student organizations at Cornell; now connected with the Y.M.C.A. in New York*

Toshi Go—*General Manager in New York, South Manchuria Railway Company*

Miss Katherine Ludington—*First Vice-President, National League of Women Voters; delegate, Institute of Pacific Relations Conferences, 1929*

Dr. Evarts B. Greene—*De Witt Clinton Professor of American History, Columbia University; author, "A New Englander in Japan (Daniel Crosby Greene)," etc.*

Dr. A. L. Warnshuis—*Secretary, International Missionary Council; member of F. P. A. Board of Directors*

Mrs. F. Louis Slade—*Delegate, Institute of Pacific Relations Conferences, 1931*

Hon. Kensuke Horinouchi—*Consul General for Japan in New York*

**ROY H. AKAGI**—*Visiting lecturer on Japanese affairs, Columbia University; delegate, Institute of Pacific Relations Conferences, 1927 and 1929*

**JAMES G. McDONALD**—*Chairman*

**T. Z. KOO**—*Vice-Chairman, World's Student Christian Federation; Administrative Secretary, Chinese Government Railroads for nine years*

**JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN**—*Professor, Public Law, Columbia University; delegate, Institute of Pacific Relations Conferences, 1929 and 1931*

Hon. Henry K. Chang—*Consul General for China in New York*

Mrs. James S. Cushman—*Member of the National Board of the Y.W.C.A.*

Dr. Edward H. Hume—*Director, New York Post-Graduate Medical School, Columbia University; formerly President, Yale-in-China*

K. C. Li—*President, Wah Chang Trading Corporation*

Cyrus H. Peake—*Lecturer in Chinese, Columbia University*

T. A. Bisson—*Member of the F. P. A. Research Staff; author of Foreign Policy Report "Basic Treaty Issues in Manchuria between Japan and China," etc.*

Chih Meng—*Associate Director, China Institute in America*

# Manchuria

[Hostilities have developed in Shanghai since this luncheon discussion. For these later developments see the publications of the F. P. A. Research Department.—Ed.]

## *MR. JAMES G. McDONALD, Chairman*

THE subject of today's discussion "Manchuria" is in the headlines, like most subjects that the F. P. A. has at its meetings. As always, we try to present two or more points of view of every controversial issue.

Today we have the good fortune of having a distinguished Chinese, a distinguished Japanese and a distinguished American to give three points of view on this important world problem.

The first speaker is our Japanese friend, Dr. Roy H. Akagi, graduate of the University of California, who took his Master's degree at the University of Chicago, and graduate study at Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania. He was a delegate at the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference in 1927 and 1929. He is a visiting lecturer on Japanese affairs at Columbia University. It is a great pleasure to present Dr. Akagi, who will open the discussion.

## *DR. ROY H. AKAGI*

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS AND GUESTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE UNSEEN AUDIENCE: Before us stands the dark mansion of Manchuria. Certain disputes are in progress under its roof. Many rumors and speculations are passed around as to the real nature of those disputes because they are shrouded in darkness. With an apology to John Ruskin's illuminating essay on "Seven Lamps of Architecture," therefore, I venture to suggest "Seven Lamps of the Manchurian Situation," with the hope of flooding that dark mansion and its problems with a searching light of understanding.

First of all, I suggest the *Lamp of Realism* in illuminating the Japanese thinking on and attitude toward Manchuria. As next-door neighbor of China, Japan occupies a unique position with regard to Manchuria which Western powers do not occupy. Let me illustrate this. In our relationship with our neighbors, proximity or distance between the parties concerned is a great factor. If your next-door neighbor's habits are distasteful and disorderly, quarrelsome and noisy; if he borrows money from you but never dreams of returning it, not even of accounting for interest accruing thereto; if he keeps untamed cats which will rob you of your

nightly sleep; if he harbors undisciplined dogs which insist upon biting the members of your family; and if, when your patience is exhausted, you ring the bell of your neighbor and discover that there is no responsible master in the house, then you will be vitally concerned with the whole situation which your friends ten blocks away or beyond the city limits can calmly look on, theorize, and even tender ideal advices.

Japan, as China's immediate next-door neighbor, occupies just such a position with regard to Manchuria as compared with the Western nations; consequently, Japan is liable to take drastic actions when her vital rights and interests in Manchuria are deliberately jeopardized in the face of her repeated friendly advices and warnings, while Europe and America, separated by a continent and an ocean, can afford to idealize the situation, and even theorize.

Thus, Japan has become a harsh realist with regard to the whole Chinese situation, especially Manchuria, and herein I believe, ladies and gentlemen, is the real key to the understanding of the present Manchurian situation. Let us take along with us, then, the Lamp of Realism when we explore the dark mansion of Manchuria.

Equally important is the *Lamp of Historic Sentiment,* of the historical origin of Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria. It is a generally known fact that Japan was driven into Manchuria by a blind force of history, and that behind that blind force of history was the hand of Russia with her grandiose dream for a Far Eastern empire.

The first act in that great Far Eastern drama in three acts was how Russia, allied with France and Germany, forced Japan to return to China the Liaotung Peninsula, which was the main fruit of the Sino-Japanese War, and how Japan smiled the prettiest smile in history and gracefully obeyed the command.

The second act was how Russia leased the very territory which she had forced Japan to give up in the name of the peace of the Far East, and how Russia and China entered into a secret treaty of offensive and defensive alliance directed against Japan, on the basis of which Russia initiated a gigantic railway scheme in Manchuria and began to swallow up that territory.

The third and last act was how Japan valiantly defied the Russian aggression by staking all in the Russo-Japanese War, and how she emerged victorious after expending over two billion yen and sacrificing 120,000 lives. It was as a fruit of that war that Japan, by the Portsmouth Treaty, had succeeded to the Russian leases, China approving of the transfer by the Peking Treaty, to what are since known as the Leased Territory of Kwantung and the South Manchuria Railway with rights and privileges appurtenant thereto.

Incidentally, Japan had saved Manchuria intact for China. Had Japan known at the time of the Portsmouth and Peking Conferences of the existence of a secret alliance between Russia and China directed against Japan, the balance sheet of the Russo-Japanese War would have been conceivably different!

Rightfully, therefore, the Japanese people cannot detach themselves from such historic background whenever they consider Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria. Play upon the harp strings of Manchuria, and the Japanese hearts will throb with this historic sentiment. You must carry with you, thus, the Lamp of Historic Sentiment when you investigate the dark mansion of Manchuria.

Closely related to the second lamp just suggested is the *Lamp of Industrialism.* The story of Japan's rise during the past sixty years from a hermit empire in the Far East to one of the great industrial powers of the world is now well known. It was in connection with her programs of expanding industrialization and of existence in the face of her growing population problem that the vital economic rights which Japan had acquired as a result of the Russo-Japanese War had turned out to be extremely significant and dear to Japan. Indeed, she lost no time in making the studied utilization of her fundamental economic interests thus acquired in Manchuria.

For this purpose Japan took the Portsmouth and Peking Treaties seriously and since that memorable year,1905, Japan had entered into no less than three-score treaties and agreements with China and, on the basis of those treaties and agreements, had invested over two billion yen in her effort to develop railroads, coal mines, iron works, and various commercial and industrial activities, as well as to spread the light of civilization.

Consequently, Manchuria has come to be regarded as part and parcel of Japan's economic structure at home, chiefly as a source of raw materials for her growing industrialism and as a market for her expanding trade, not to say anything about its connection with her food supply. Consequently also, any threat upon that Manchurian life line came to be rightly regarded as a threat upon her own national existence. Whether or not we shall be allowed to maintain that Manchurian life-line intact in pursuance of the existing treaties, in short, is to the Japanese people a question of life and death today. So I suggest the Lamp of Japan's Industrialism, especially in its relationship with her economic rights in Manchuria.

In this connection let me emphasize the fact, borne witness to by every American and European student of Asiatic affairs, that the Japanese activities in Manchuria were just as beneficial to China as to Japan herself. Twenty-five years of Japan's unremitting toil in South Manchuria helped to transform that portion of Manchuria, to borrow a British publicist's phrase, into "a flourishing oasis in the howling desert of misrule and banditry." The migration into Manchuria of nearly six million Chinese

during the past eight years is alone a living testimony of the Chinese masses to that great transformation. Before the advent of the Japanese, moreover, Manchuria's foreign trade was negligible. Today it amounts to 755,000,000 Haikwan taels. The export of beans and bean products alone which Japan helped to introduce to the world market, is valued at 255,000,000 Haikwan taels.

The fourth lamp with which American friends should not fail to illuminate the present Manchurian situation is the *Lamp of Japan's Treaty Rights* in Manchuria, almost dimmed by China's deliberate obstructionist policy. In observing Japan's great achievements in Manchuria, China at first became jealous and then hostile toward Japan. Cleverly manipulating the rising tide of Nationalism, China began to mobilize every possible means in an effort to obstruct, even to undermine, the legitimate enjoyment by Japanese in Manchuria of their acquired treaty rights.

This is highly important, ladies and gentlemen. Being misled by clever Chinese propaganda and absorbed in the kaleidoscopic events before us, many of our Western friends failed to note the fact that China, not Japan, was responsible in provoking the conflict by a deliberate and consistent policy of overt and covert hostility toward Japan, spread over a period of years and manifested in violent propaganda, voluminous violations of Japan's treaty rights, and countless insulting outrages. When called upon to account, China irresponsibly evaded the issues and insincerely loosened the reverse propaganda further to undermine the Japanese position, always trusting that the League of Nations, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the Nine-Power Treaty would eventually be invoked on her behalf should Japan assert her rights by force.

Let me go a step further by outlining a few of those flagrant violations by China of Japan's treaty rights in Manchuria. Among them are:

*First,* obstruction of the activities of the South Manchuria Railway through the construction of parallel lines by ignoring conditions stipulated in an agreement.

*Second,* refusal to repay the loans and interests accruing thereto for the Japan-constructed railways now being profitably run by the Chinese.

*Third,* interference with the legitimate enjoyment by the Japanese subjects of rights to lease land and to reside for business purposes in Manchuria, all guaranteed by the treaties.

*Fourth,* imposition of various illegal taxes and duties against treaty provisions in order to drive out Japanese commercial activities from Manchuria.

*Fifth,* persecution of Koreans through illegal taxation, eviction, robbery, violence, breaking of contracts, etc.

*Sixth,* disregard of Japanese treaty rights relating to mines, railroad constructions, lumbering, travel, communication, joint enterprises, consular courts, etc.

These acts are well seasoned with continuous outbreaks of systematically conducted anti-Japanese demonstrations and overtures.

Pushing Will Rogers' metaphor further, the situation is somewhat as follows: China owns the lot. Japan leased it and built a modern apartment thereon. The apartment was so well managed and beautiful and comfortable, that even the Chinese began to prefer to live therein. So now China wants the lease turned in and to occupy the apartment. Failing, she began to interfere with the business of the apartment house and even to commit various kinds of vandalism!

In facing and handling these delicate situations, Japan has consistently maintained the policy of conciliation wisely adopted by Baron Shidehara with due regard to China's national honor and welfare. Yet China, instead of appreciating Japan's conciliatory attitude, began to take advantage of it and to increase aggressive acts. It is not surprising, therefore, that from those treaty violations have grown more than three hundred cases which are still awaiting settlement due to China's consistent policy of equivocation and procrastination. And yet for these treaty violations, China—and China alone—not an international organization, nor an international instrument, shall be responsible. Let us not forget, then, the Lamp of Japan's Treaty Rights in Manchuria.

This brings us to the fifth lamp, the *Lamp of Self-Defense.* The September 18th affair—the destruction of a portion of the South Manchuria Railway tracks by uniformed Chinese soldiers—was a daring, open violation by Chinese regular troops of the Sino-Japanese treaties, a veritable armed infringement upon Japan's treaty rights, and a challenging climax to China's continued overt hostilities toward Japan.

Here, ladies and gentlemen, was a situation which demands proper perspective to understand and appreciate the Japanese action. Crowning years of hostilities, the Chinese regular troops openly defied and challenged Japan's treaty rights in Manchuria by penetrating the railway zone and actually wrecking the railway track. Should similar acts be perpetrated in defiance of American treaty rights in Cuba or Nicaragua or, better still, in the Panama Canal Zone, what would the United States do? The Japanese patience was exhausted. It was, indeed, the last straw. In self-defense, therefore, the Japanese railway guards immediately answered the challenge and repulsed the Chinese soldiers in the act of depredation. In self-defense, moreover, they were forced to adopt necessary measures of forestalling imminent disaster and the spread of disorder.

The events of September have, however, in spite of Japan's wishes, created a new responsibility and a wider sphere of action for Japan. Her acts of self-defense and precaution resulted in her having to assume the responsibility of temporarily maintaining law and order over a wide area. For one thing, Chinese local authorities almost unanimously fled or resigned. Then also a large number of unruly bandits began to take advantage of the situation. It was Japan's duty to make her defensive activities as little disturbing as possible to the inhabitants, but it would have been a breach of that very duty to have left the population a prey to anarchy.

Moreover, especially since the beginning of November, bandit activities greatly increased. For instance, bandit raids in the vicinity of the Japanese railway zone alone numbered 1529 during the forty days ending December 10! And it has been proven by the examination of prisoners and seized documents that their depredations were being carried on through the Chinese military authorities at Chinchow. Someone has well said that the only difference between a Chinese soldier and a bandit is the difference between the cream and the skimmed milk!

Under these abnormal circumstances peculiar to Manchuria, Japan was obliged to take up an indispensable task of pushing the measures of self-defense until the source of provocation was completely crushed and of temporarily adopting effective police measures against widespread banditry and other lawless elements. And new responsible local governments are already rapidly rising in the wake of these temporary measures. In short, Japan has been and is doing what other nations have done and would do under a similar exigency of circumstances.

In the light of the historical background and peculiar prevailing circumstances already described, then, Japan's position is clear. Japan's action has been purely one of self-defense and precaution against China's armed infringement upon Japan's treaty rights. She has not for a moment entertained a thought of going to war against her neighbor. She has repeatedly disavowed her territorial ambition in Manchuria. Nor does she ask for additional new rights. What Japan reasonably and most emphatically demands is the acceptable guarantee for her acquired treaty rights in Manchuria, including the security of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there and the cessation of open hostilities against legitimate Japanese activities in China. Her action is, in short, in defense of the *sanctity of her acquired treaty rights.* It is extremely important, then, to add the Lamp of Self-Defense.

Let me here bring in the *Lamp of Chinese Politics,* of chaotic political status in China. When everything is said, the last and the most fundamental problem is the lack of a united, responsible, and stable government in China, the succeeding régimes assuming no responsibility for the actions of the preceding régimes. The very vagueness of the relationship between

the Nanking and the Manchurian Governments is precisely to the point. The present Manchurian situation is not, and could not be, the product of two responsible governments. It is the regrettable outcome of the relationship between a responsible government and a series of irresponsible "governments" of, by and for the war lords. Japan, more than any other nation, welcomes the united and stabilized government in China. This, ladies and gentlemen, is the fundamental cause of the present Manchurian situation. (You will recall that this is the very reason why American and Western gunboats are still on Chinese waters.) I urgently urge you, therefore, not to exclude the Lamp of Chinese Politics in looking into the dark mansion of Manchuria.

The last but not the least in its importance, I suggest the *Lamp of Open Door Policy* in Manchuria. The rumored fear that Japan may possibly terminate the open door policy in Manchuria is utterly groundless and absolutely unnecessary. Japan has scrupulously upheld the principles of the open door and equal opportunity in Manchuria and, as our Foreign Minister has already repeatedly emphasized, she fully intends to uphold those principles. Japan's tolerant faith in the open door policy grew even with the expanding meaning thereof until she helped to raise it, in its inflated form, to the dignity of a treaty stipulation at the Washington Conference.

The open door policy, however, is incompatible with lawlessness and anarchy. "What Japan desires," in the language of our Foreign Minister, "is only to secure peace and order in Manchuria and to make the region safe for both Chinese and foreigners and open to all foreign economic development." The most dangerous enemy of the open door policy in Manchuria, in short, is not Japan who is championing the cause of law and order and the sanctity of treaties, but irresponsible war lords and unruly bandits. In fact, it is China who is trying to close doors in the Japanese face—(in the Russian face in 1929 and in the faces of many other nations through several years)—by nullifying treaties and by bringing illegal pressures to bear upon legitimate Japanese activities. By all means, therefore, make good use of the Lamp of Open Door Policy in Manchuria.

Here then, ladies and gentlemen, are the Seven Lamps of the present Manchurian situation: Realism, Historic Sentiment, Industrialism, Treaty Rights, Self-Defense, Chaotic Chinese Politics, and Open Door Policy. Take all of them with you when you try to scrutinize the dark mansion of Manchuria and the disputes under its roof. Above all, light them with the Light of Facts, especially with the light of impartial facts with which the Far Eastern Commission of the League of Nations, in the appointing of which Japan as a member of the League Council fully concurred, will provide us soon, and I am confident that Japan's position in the present Manchurian situation will be clearly understood and amply vindicated. I thank you!

THE CHAIRMAN: The second speaker is a distinguished Chinese, well known to many of us for many years, Dr. T. Z. Koo, a graduate of St. Johns University in Shanghai, Administrative Secretary, Chinese Government Railroads for nine years, Vice-Chairman, World's Student Christian Federation and Chinese delegate to the Second Opium Conference in 1925. It is a great privilege now to present to you Dr. Koo!

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## *DR. T. Z. KOO*

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The League of Nations' Council at its Paris meeting in November last, decided on the appointment of a Neutral Commission to study the Manchurian embroglio between China and Japan. This afternoon, I propose to outline the three major aspects of this crisis which I feel the Commission must take under advisement. These three aspects are, first, the basic causes which underlie the struggle between China and Japan; second, the manner and means adopted by China and Japan in Manchuria since September 18, 1931; and, third, the wider implications of this situation for world peace.

I would like to treat very briefly the three aspects for you this afternoon. Take first of all the aspect of the basic issues which underlie the trouble between China and Japan in Manchuria. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Manchuria was traversed by a railroad system controlled practically by Russia. Now that railroad system has a horizontal line running from Manchuli on one side to Vladivostok on the other and a vertical line running from Harbin to Dalny. These two flutes (indicating) will more or less represent the railroad situation in Manchuria up to 1905, as far as the territory was concerned—a system controlled practically by Russia.

After the Russo-Japanese War, a part of this vertical line (indicating) from Changchun to Dalny was transferred to Japan and became known as the South Manchuria Railway, so instead of one railroad system in Manchuria you find there are two railroad systems, the horizontal line remaining Russian, together with part of the vertical line, and the other part of the vertical line becoming entirely Japanese.

Within the last ten years, or since 1922, China also began to develop her railroads in Manchuria. When China found there were already these two foreign systems, one Russian and one Japanese, we took that into consideration in building our own system. I have made here a little circle to show how this Chinese system is built (demonstrating). As you can readily see, when you have already a horizontal and a vertical system, the only other system you can put in is a circular one. The Chinese system is neither a

horizontal nor a vertical one; it is more or less a circular one intended to link up the three capital cities of Manchuria, namely Mukden, Kirin and Tsitsihar, independently of either the Russian or Japanese lines.

Now, the red lines that are marked on the circle represent gaps which China had not yet connected with railroads, but all the other parts that are not marked in red represent Chinese railroads built with Chinese money, except for one section of about 260 miles, which is the part that Professor Akagi referred to as built with Japanese money. With the exception of that one short part of 260 miles the remaining 800 miles of railroads are entirely built with Chinese money.

I want you to see this railroad situation because here you have revealed the first basic issue between China and Japan. If you will look at this railroad system, forgetting this horizontal line for the time being, you will see that before China put in her railroad system all the economic development of this part of Manchuria was necessarily monopolized by that Japanese railroad. But after you put in this circular system again (demonstrating), you see you at least have the option of using this vertical line or this circular line. There you have the first concrete problem before China and Japan.

Now is Japan to be allowed to maintain that monopoly for all time or is China to be given a share in the economic development of her own territory? There you have the first basic issue of the situation in Manchuria today.

The second basic issue comes out of the question of tenure of land. Manchuria up to about 1878 was a piece of fairly thinly populated land. But during the past thirty years three streams of people have been pouring into it, namely, the Chinese, the Koreans, and the Japanese. Up to 1930, the Chinese population in Manchuria had grown to 30,000,000, Koreans to 800,000, and Japanese to 200,000. You see very clearly that as far as the population is concerned the character is overwhelmingly Chinese. From this movement of population into Manchuria, a fundamental question has arisen between China and Japan. The first concern of a people trying to settle in another country is the tenure of land. If the tenure of land is secure and permanent, the settler can go ahead and develop it; if the tenure is not permanent or insecure, then of course the development will be affected.

Let us take the Koreans first. As Japanese subjects they still enjoy extra-territorial status, and as such cannot own land in China. They can lease land, but they cannot own it. Yet for a farmer a lease is not as good as outright ownership, and so many Koreans have taken on Chinese citizenship. Under ordinary circumstances that would not constitute a problem, but Japan has forbidden her Korean subjects to give up

their Japanese citizenship. Therefore, we now have in Manchuria many Koreans who enjoy the convenience of a double citizenship. If a Korean gets into trouble with the Chinese authorities, he can reply, "I am a Japanese subject." If he gets into trouble with the Japanese authorities, he can say, "I have become a Chinese citizen."

The obvious solution of such a problem is for China and Japan to say, "Let us settle this once and for all, and either make a Korean a Chinese subject or a Japanese subject." However, if he becomes Chinese, then the benefits of his development of Manchuria flow back to China. If he remains a Japanese subject, then the benefits flow back to Japan. And so Japan is interested in keeping the Koreans Japanese citizens. Yet by remaining Japanese citizens they lose the right to own land in Manchuria.

Take the Japanese problem. Professor Akagi said that the Japanese subjects want the right to lease land for agricultural and commercial purposes. That is ordinarily done between citizens of various countries. For instance, your people can lease a piece of property in China and we never raise a kick about it. Why then is it when the same question arises in Manchuria we have a problem? In 1915, Japan presented a set of demands upon China called the "Twenty-One Demands." One of these demands was to compel China to lease land to her subjects for industrial and agricultural purposes in Manchuria, with these two interpretations added: *First,* the right of lease must be for a period of thirty years. That clause is not so very bad because, whether long or short, a lease must have a term to it. *Second,* that when such a lease expires at the end of the thirtieth year, the renewal or cancellation is not at the option of the owner but at the option of the lessee; it must be unconditionally renewable. That you see puts a very different complexion upon this same article of lease. A lease on this basis practically means the land is gone for as long as the lessee wants it.

Here is the second basic issue. In order to develop her schemes in Manchuria, Japan has got to have fairly permanent tenure of land. China feels that she cannot allow Japanese subjects to lease land in Manchuria on the terms dictated to her in 1915. You have to reconcile these two points of view before you can settle the problem of Manchuria in any intelligent way.

The third great cause of trouble between China and Japan is to be found in the leases of territory and railroad concessions that Professor Akagi has mentioned. Take for instance the South Manchuria Railway. This railway has a contract in which it is stipulated that China shall have the right to buy it back from Japan at the end of the thirty-sixth year. If China does not buy it back at the end of the thirty-sixth year, then the contract will run on until the eightieth year when the road will be given

back to China without any cost. That clause is a definite clause in an international agreement.

Now notice that the thirty-sixth year would have fallen in the year 1939. Twenty-four years before that expiration, twenty-four years before 1939, in 1915, Japan presented to us as one of the "Twenty-One Demands," a demand that we extend the lease of that railroad to run for ninety-nine years, which would have run the contract to 2002. This demand was backed up with an ultimatum of war with a forty-eight hour limit. Now here you see an illustration of how seriously Japan regards the sanctity of treaties.

The last point on these so-called basic issues, the last basic issue I want to stress for you, is the fact that in Manchuria today you are seeing definitely a clash of political policy. Japanese political policy has always been to isolate Manchuria gradually from China so that the idea would get around the world that Manchuria was a special part of China, or that it was not a part of China, or that it was a sort of No Man's Land, so when the time came for annexation perhaps the world would not raise much of a row.

China's policy is naturally just the reverse. She wants to make Manchuria more definitely an integral part of China. And this is the fourth basic issue between the two countries.

In this first realm of basic issues, as seen through the competition in railroads, as seen through this question of tenure of land, as seen through this question relating to leases of territory and railroads, and as seen through this question of political policies, it would be futile merely to try to balance treaty rights of Japan and China against each other. That will not bring a permanent solution. The only permanent solution that could be evolved out of such a situation is to try to study these basic issues as dispassionately and as scientifically as possible and try to suggest a solution that will be based upon the mutual recognition of the needs of the two countries in Manchuria.

Now let me pass on to outline for you very briefly the question of the manner and means adopted by China and Japan in Manchuria since September 18, 1931. The attitude of China can be summed up in a few words: China had known for some time that Japan was prepared to spring a coup of some kind in Manchuria. When I passed through Japan in August, my friends in Tokio warned me then that something was going to happen in Manchuria. When I visited Mukden September 9, 1931, about two weeks before the incident, both my Chinese and Western friends expressed to me their concern that Japan was preparing to start some coup in Manchuria. Of course, nobody knew what the nature of the trouble was going to be. The Chinese Government had therefore instructed their military forces not to resist in case of a military demonstration by Japan. So all over Manchuria especially during the first part of the trouble China

did not resist the military advances of Japan. Then if the trouble threatened to become serious, China intended to submit the case before the League of Nations, since both China and Japan are members of the League.

What Japan did and is doing in Manchuria since September 18, 1931, can be summed up also very briefly. I made a visit to Mukden from October 8 to October 14. The purpose of the visit was simply this: as soon as Japan came into Manchuria, all sources of communication were cut off from China. Therefore, any news we got in China of Manchuria necessarily came from Japanese sources. I felt it would be necessary, if I were to understand this situation to go to Manchuria personally.

I saw three or four things that were happening there. *First,* Japan had made a clean sweep of any vestige of the Chinese Government in the occupied territory. In Mukden all the offices of the civil government, the barracks, the arsenals, the police stations, the aviation field, the wireless and telegraph offices, were taken over by the Japanese. When you have seen that with your own eyes, and also on top of that, when you have felt a Japanese bayonet sticking up against your own chest, and when you have felt the hands of a Japanese soldier going over your person, I think you will agree with me that no amount of words today can convince me that Japan has not made war upon China in Manchuria.

*Second,* in all the cities occupied by Japan, she has set up Chinese committees that exist side by side with the Japanese Government in the city. When I entered Mukden, for instance, I found a Japanese mayor and Japanese officiating as the heads of the city government in that city. Well, I was not surprised at that because Japan had occupied the city and naturally she would set up a government of some kind for it; but I was surprised to find that just beside the Japanese officials there was a Chinese committee known by the very curious name of Committee for the Preservation of Peace.

I began to look into the purpose of such a committee because it was difficult for me to visualize how a Chinese committee could function in a city ruled by Japanese under that rather peculiar name. I found that that committee is used by Japan for two purposes. The first purpose is that they want a Chinese committee on which they can hang the fiction of an independent government. The very strange thing was that that committee did not know that it had been announced to the world by Japan as the independent government for South Manchuria. Until I told the committee what had been done, it had not realized that it was being dignified before the world as the independent government for South Manchuria.

The second purpose is a more subtle one. Japan is using this committee as a cover for the transfer of rights and properties. One illustration will

show you what I mean. Sometime ago, you will remember, that the Chinese delegate at the League of Nations, Dr. Alfred Sze, charged Japan with the seizing of the salt revenues of Manchuria. The Japanese delegate, Mr. Yoshizawa, denied that Japan had done so. Strange as it may seem, in this case both China and Japan were right. The salt revenues were taken in the name of the Chinese committee. China considers this committee just a creature of the Japanese Government, so we charge Japan with the act. The Japanese can at least deny technically that they had seized the revenues because they had been taken in the name of the Chinese committee. You can begin to see clearly just why committees of this nature are being set up.

*Third,* under cover of military occupation—I find it difficult to talk calmly about this—today we are seeing a systematic attempt to monopolize, disrupt and disorganize the economic structure that China has built up in Manchuria. Japan has not told the world that the economic structure of Manchuria was by no means wholly Japanese, but that a great part of it was Chinese. Within the last ten years alone we put our own money into 800 miles of railroads. With a country as disorganized as the Japanese would have you believe China is, how could that be done? You can begin to sense that this question involves the whole economic development existing in Manchuria. For instance, in Mukden, Chinese factories are being taken over and operated by Japanese. Sino-Japanese concerns are meeting with the same fate. Chinese railroads are occupied and run as Japanese lines. What they cannot use, they destroy. Should the territory later be evacuated by Japan, she will have set the clock back for us economically for at least a quarter of a century.

*Fourth,* Japan since her entry has raised a bandit situation in Manchuria so as to furnish a pretext for non-withdrawal. Now some people in Manchuria would say that Japan had herself abetted and armed the bandits. Of course, I have no proof of that at all, so I am not going to repeat that, but this much is true. There are, of course, bandits in Manchuria as there are bandits in any other part of the world, but the fact remains that before Japan came in we had our police system, we had our militia, we had our army posts, and these were sufficient to keep in check to a certain extent the bandit situation, and therefore we have had no major bandit menace in Manchuria during the last decade. Since Japan has come in, she has removed all these checks and has not had time to put in her own checks over these bandits. What is the result? Naturally, Manchuria becomes a paradise for bandits. I think you can all understand that situation.

In this second realm of the manner and means adopted by Japan and China in Manchuria, the Neutral Commission must determine how far the letter and spirit of the Kellogg Peace Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty and the

Covenant of the League of Nations have been respected, and how far they have been trampled underfoot and regarded as mere scraps of paper.

My last word will be on the aspect of the Manchurian situation in its wider implications for world peace. If the situation were limited only to Japan and China, it would not be so serious, but unfortunately that is not so. Neither China nor Japan as far as the people are concerned want to go to war. We have no desire to fight Japan; neither have the Japanese, the common people, any desire to fight with us. Yet in spite of the fact, of the majority of people not wanting to fight, you see this situation in Manchuria. How has it happened?

Japan has said to the world the thing has happened because her own military people have run away with the situation, (you see even modern governments run loose at times) and swung an unwilling government into a course of action against its own will. The situation is a very apt illustration of one of your phrases, "The tail wags the dog"—the tail being the military group of Japan, the body of the dog the Japanese nation, so the tail in this instance is wagging the dog and not the dog wagging its own tail.

How is it that a minority group of military-minded people can force a nation into a line of action that it is not willing to undertake? I think that is the crucial point for you to ask if you are interested in world peace, and I am going to give you an answer which I hope you will think over. When a nation goes in for armaments—always of course for defensive purposes—two things happen: Visible armaments, such as armies, navies, and air fleets, are created. An invisible but potent attitude of mind is created in a section of the people which simply cannot resist the itch of wanting to use these armaments on somebody.

Have you ever watched a group of children play? When suddenly one of them gets hold of a stick, what is the first instinctive thing that happens? There is the itch of wanting to lay that stick on somebody's head. When nations play with armaments you see exactly the same psychology. That is why a military group can stampede a nation into a course of action that it does not want to take. You saw it in Europe in the early months of 1914, and you see it again today, this time on the plains of Manchuria.

Whether you are for war or for peace, it is not for me to say, but face the facts, and try to take this point into consideration.

The second implication is that militarism in one nation begets militarism in another nation. Take the reaction of Chinese young people to this Manchurian situation. Their one reaction was, "Do not go to the League. Let us arm ourselves and fight it out," even though they realized that the

odds were hopelessly against China in a military way! The trend towards militarism is unmistakable.

If this situation is left alone it will develop into a sort of Alsace-Lorraine between China and Japan. Suppose we fight, and Japan is driven out, what then? She will prepare herself and come back again. Suppose we are driven out, what then? The Chinese will prepare and come back again. So it will go on for years to come, and it will be good-bye to peace in the Far East.

The last point I will make is that this Manchurian situation constitutes a major test of the efficacy of all instruments for the preservation of world peace. China has brought the case to the League, as you all know. Suppose the League, taking this case under advisement, goes to Japan and says, "Now you two people have got to settle your troubles peacefully," if they can follow that demand through with some kind of pressure that would compel them to settle the matter peacefully the people of the world would say, "This League of Nations is after all of some use. Let us support it." But suppose the League takes a look at the situation and says, "You two have to settle this matter peacefully," but cannot follow it through by any effective action, the people of the world will say, "Something must be wrong with the League of Nations; I will not support it."

I urge you to realize this when you look at this Manchurian situation. It has been a great assault on the validity and efficacy of all the international instruments for peace and world order at a moment when the world can least afford to have those instruments and great organizations threatened in any way. I hope you will realize that in all this whole situation there is an implication even for you here in the United States, that you have your part to play in taking upon you some of the burden that will fall on the nation if it is really to see these great international movements become living understandings.

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THE CHAIRMAN: I feel sure that not only the audience here but the much larger radio audience will share with me this feeling that our two friends from China and Japan have shown us not merely how to debate a highly controversial subject with rare skill and intelligence, but what is much rarer under such circumstances, great moderation.

This discussion so far reminds me very much of the conference we had at the Institute of Pacific Relations in Kioto in 1929, and as I understand they had at the later meeting of the Institute this fall in Shanghai. There Chinese and Japanese were able to discuss day after day and week after week these vital questions, which touched them to the very quick, and yet

always they discussed them as intelligent and civilized men and women. I very much doubt whether under comparable circumstances we Westerners would have done nearly so well.

And now our third speaker today is an American freshly returned from the meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Shanghai. He is Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain, member of the Foreign Policy Association Board of Directors, Professor of Public Law at Columbia University, and one of the group engaged in intensive research projects of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the Manchurian and related problems. Because Professor Chamberlain is an American, we are not giving him the full measure of time that we have given to our Chinese and Japanese friends, but we are asking him to tell us everything he knows about Manchuria in fifteen minutes.

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## *PROFESSOR JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN*

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I think it would be very easy for me to tell you all I know about Manchuria in fifteen minutes. Most of what I will be able to talk about this afternoon is what I have heard about Manchuria. The little that I have seen there, and the little actual knowledge I have of conditions there wouldn't take me more than two or three minutes to expound to you very fully, and it would not help very much in your understanding of the situation after what you have already heard.

There are only two points which I want to bring out in order to give you a little fuller understanding of the railroad and the land proposition in Manchuria. Mr. Koo has shown you the position of the Japanese railroads relative to the Chinese roads. Now I want you to consider it from the legal point of view. Under a treaty the Japanese have the right to operate and maintain this railroad, running some 600 miles into the interior of Manchuria. It is a Japanese Government railroad, controlled by the Government and owned entirely by Japanese individuals and by the Government. It is not subject to the control of the Manchurian Government. Persons who are injured on that railroad have no recourse in the Manchurian courts. Their recourse is through the Japanese courts or diplomatic representations. In many cases Chinese claim that they have been ill-treated as passengers travelling on the road and as shippers over the railroad. Just imagine a railroad running from here to Cleveland, not under the control of the United States or state governments, and not subject to suit in American courts in case of any injury that may have been

suffered on the road or for any losses which may have happened to freight carried on the road, and I think you will understand the enormous difficulties involved in the operation of the South Manchuria railroad even if its legal position under the treaties is strictly observed.

I think it is a very remarkable thing that the Japanese have been able to operate the road for so many years without having the clash come sooner. This is one of the conditions which make it very evident that there must be consideration of the facts, legal, political and economic, before any reasonable solution can be made with any hope that it will result in preserving the peace in the sorely tried Three Eastern Provinces.

One other factor in respect to the situation is the leasing of land by Japanese subjects, and in order to judge the situation there are two facts you should consider. One is the legal fact of extra-territoriality, the right which the foreign holder of land in China would normally have to be judged by his own consuls in any case in which he is a defendant and when he goes into the Chinese courts, his own consul may appear in the court. As a consequence of this situation you will see that land so leased will not be under sole control of the local government and the foreigners farming it will have a privileged position, which, if a large amount of land be so occupied, would be almost certain to cause friction between the Chinese officials and the foreigners. The situation in the cities is not so serious.

Under an agreement in respect to Koreans it is provided that Koreans holding land in a certain section, the Chientao region, must appear before the Chinese courts and must be subject to Chinese law. The Japanese consul may attend the court to see that they are fairly judged. But it is certain that even with this protection they have not always received their due, that there has been much abuse of the Korean settlers in Manchuria by the Chinese authorities, and that there are very grave questions which will arise if the Korean settlers are to be protected and are to receive the treatment which as poor farmer pioneers in that great country they are entitled to.

The Chinese Government naturally objects to leasing large quantities of land to foreigners who are to be protected by their own Government. The Japanese Government is perfectly right in saying that on the record it does not feel safe in letting the Koreans live in Manchuria under Chinese Courts. Either position may be defended on the facts. Obviously some provision must be made for a settlement that will not be based on purely legal rights. There must be some form of cooperation between the two countries and the Governments of the two countries, if there is to be peace and prosperity in Manchuria.

Just one more word about the railroad situation, as you must be getting a little tired of the railroads in Manchuria, but here's what a Chinese mer-

chant in Manchuria said: "We want some kind of an organization that will enable the whole railway net of Manchuria to be used as a unit for the benefit of the people of Manchuria. We don't want a Japanese road that is competing freely with the Chinese road, and we don't want Chinese roads operated to destroy the Japanese." Both will be necessary to handle the business of the great country when the business gets back to what it was.

I believe that the very hard times which we have had recently in business have had their effect, and a very decided effect, in causing this situation to become acute at this present time. From what I have said and from what you have heard today from both sides, you can readily see, that the incident of September 18, admitting that it was done by Chinese soldiers, is not the cause nor the reason for this action of Japan. The reason goes far behind that action, which at most may have been the match that touched off the chain of events and led to the present situation.

The thing that I wanted to say was that up to the end of the railroad year ending on March 1, 1930, the South Manchuria Railway had shown very large profits and increasing profits. The business of Manchuria was large enough to support the railroad and also to support the Chinese roads. Since 1930 I think you all know what has happened—the soya bean has dropped as much as steel or any other product. Consequently there is not enough business for everybody, and the Chinese roads are getting the business—not because of direct violations of the treaty, but partly because people are anxious now to ship their beans for the lowest possible rate, and the Chinese roads are operating on a silver basis, those of you who read the newspapers know what that means, whereas the South Manchuria Railway is operating on a yen basis, which until recently was on a gold basis.

This situation has made more acute the situation that already existed, and has brought to a head the difficulty of operating these two systems of roads under the present conditions. Some means must be found to bring order into the railway situation in Manchuria.

I think that we should realize the importance of two circumstances, first, the commission that has been set up by the League of Nations, the fact-finding commission, which was in itself a compromise between the positions of the two countries taken at first before the Council. The second is that you cannot localize this issue to Manchuria. Already the results of the action of Japan in Manchuria have been most serious in the whole of the Republic of China. It has risked, and threatens to risk even more, not only the foreign rights and the foreign business in Manchuria (that is not so serious) but all the business in the whole of the Republic of China. Because, or partly because of the Japanese action in Manchuria, the only government that I know of that seemed likely to have any power in China

has fallen. Chiang Kai Shek will probably come back again, but with a more difficult situation facing him, and as a result of this action and of the action that you saw in the paper this morning at Shanghai, there may be less government in China. The consequences of the resulting chaos to the Chinese people, to the business interests in the world, and to the lives and property of foreigners throughout the whole Republic of China, are most serious.

The interest of the foreign governments, and of the United States in particular, seems to me therefore very clear. It is not a situation solely between the two countries. It is not a situation that can be allowed to go on and develop into a chaotic war in China and cause chaotic difficulties in the whole of the Chinese Republic, but it is a situation that lends itself to settlement, to some form of conciliation between the two countries with the aid of the Commission of the League that has already been set up to go to Manchuria to try to make clear the basic facts in the dispute.

I think there is another treaty that Dr. Akagi should have mentioned in order to make clear the position of the United States that Mr. Stimson recently took, and that is the Nine-Power Pact. One of the provisions of the Nine-Power Pact, to which all the powers have agreed, was an agreement to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. In his recent note Mr. Stimson says, "With the recent military operations about Chinchow the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed."

I believe that the very seriousness of the situation will bring the active use of the means which have been set into force for its settlement, and the fact that both countries have accepted the League Commission and have agreed to cooperate with it, that the United States has followed the League of Nations in an effort to settle the issue, is the best proof that there will be a satisfactory settlement, and the danger that we fear in China itself, as well as in Manchuria, will be conjured away.

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THE CHAIRMAN: I knew that the world depression was responsible for many things, but Professor Chamberlain has just laid at its door a new indictment, and he has put the Manchurian question at the door of the depression.

Now we have a brief period of questions and answers. I hope the questions will be questions rather than speeches. I would be glad to hear the first question.

I have here a telegram which is from the radio audience. not from the whole radio audience, but from one member of it, so I think, perhaps, I ought to give it priority. It was put in my hands just as I started to make the announcement about the question period. It comes from Milford, New Hampshire. The question is for the Japanese speaker. It is, Dr. Akagi: *"Why does Japan oppose outside arbitration?"* and is signed Mark F. Emerson.

Dr. Akagi: Japan does not oppose outside arbitration. At the time when the incident happened, Japan was in direct negotiation with China, and Japan had confidence that the question would be settled then. Since then Japan has discovered that instead of bringing the facts before the world there was on foot a movement to intervene in those direct negotiations with Japan and China. That is the very thing to which Japan objected.

The illustration that Japan does not object to international arbitration is in the very fact that Japan fully concurred in the appointment of the Far Eastern Commission, which is to investigate the facts. When the facts are revealed Japan is confident that her position will be vindicated.

Moreover, there is one more point. Japan has been standing on the sanctity of treaties not on the validity of treaties. When the question of the validity of treaties is voiced by our friend and neighbor, China, in direct diplomatic notes to Japan, that is the time to take up the matter of the validity of treaties before the world. Today it is the sanctity of the treaties.

The Chairman: Where is the next question, either from the radio audience, or from the less important audience here.

Question: *Supposing Japan should decide after the League has finished its investigations that there shall be peace with China, with what constituted authority will she deal to settle the Manchurian question to insure enforcement of the provisions of the agreement?*

Dr. Koo: The National Government of China is the one situated in Nanking. As long as that government is in existence that necessarily is the right body to deal with. But now, there is the question of those independent governments that are now arising in Manchuria. Until those are either brushed aside or something is done with them, of course, you cannot have any settlement that would be carried out; there would not be any government that would carry out its orders in Manchuria.

Question: *I would like to ask the Japanese speaker whether he applies the same sanctity to treaties that are forced on weaker nations by stronger nations at the point of a gun as he would apply to a treaty that was en-*

*tered into between two nations in a case where neither was stronger or there was not an overpowering advantage on either side.* I have in mind this: My impression is that Japan is now taking its warlike activities to enforce its supposed treaty rights which they forced upon China under the name of "Twenty-One Points."

THE CHAIRMAN: Will you stop there? I think your question is quite clear and your point also. It is addressed to you, Dr. Akagi.

DR. AKAGI: Japan does not discriminate between the two types of treaties just mentioned for the simple reason that under the prevailing principles of international law those two types of treaties do not exist.

In answer to the second point, the implied question with regard to the 1915 treaty, I would like to dwell upon it a little longer. What I have already said answers one point, namely: There is an opinion that the treaties, those obtained in 1915, are null and void because they are said to have been obtained from China under duress or non-peaceful methods, if there is at all a treaty which was obtained under peaceful methods. What I mean is this: Suppose Mexico were to come along now and say to the United States, "the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, by which Mexico in the middle of the last century ceded a lot of territory in the western part of the country, was obtained under duress. Therefore, we do not recognize the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Please return the territory because the treaty was obtained by the United States from Mexico under duress."

Better still, let us use another illustration, and suppose Japan were to accede to China all right in Manchuria. Then Japan could turn around and say, "As the result of the Sino-Japanese War you obtained from us the Liaotung Peninsula under duress. We do not recognize that transaction. Please return to Japan, therefore, the Liaotung Peninsula."

Under the prevailing principles of international law, may I repeat, that there is no discriminating line, no distinction between the two types of treaties.

THE CHAIRMAN: There is a question here addressed to our Chinese friend. It says: *Why did Eugene Chen, who is, I think, now the acting Foreign Minister at Nanking, say, or was reported to say in Tokio, that China is pinpricking Japan into war?*

DR. KOO: I do not know, of course, whether this statement actually was made by Eugene Chen or not. I am not responsible for the suggestion that it was made by him, but I think I can help you to see that the action taken by China and Japan together must be considered a mutual process of pinpricking because there are certain things that Japan is pricking us about, and undoubtedly there are many things on which we are pricking

Japan. But the important thing to remember is that merely to ascertain the number of pinpricks on each side solves no problem.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have here a question to put to Professor Chamberlain, which I should like to read. *Will Professor Chamberlain explain the implication in the State Department's last note to China and Japan about not accepting any situation, treaty or covenant arrived at by means not in agreement with the terms of the Pact of Paris; that is, by other than peaceful means?*

PROFESSOR CHAMBERLAIN: I am afraid that would take a great deal more time than three times three minutes, and as it does not refer directly to Manchuria I think it would be fairer to the audience to let questions that have to do directly with Manchuria come before it.

All that I can say is that this is a statement made by the Secretary of what apparently he thinks might be a sanction for the Kellogg Pact; any action taken contrary to the Kellogg Pact would be a breach of an agreement between the government taking such action and the United States. Therefore the United States would have the right to take some action. If a treaty or situation is forced by a Pact-breaking state, on a state which observed the Pact, the Secretary implies that a proper action would be for the United States to refuse to recognize it, since it was arrived at through a breach of an engagement toward the United States.

I believe that the case will not come up since I have hope that with the world importance of the very difficult situation in Manchuria and the great interests involved, Chinese, Japanese and third powers, that a settlement will be come to as the result of the recommendations of the Commission.

THE CHAIRMAN: We have another question here from a member of the radio audience which has just been telephoned in. It is addressed to Dr. Akagi: *What does he think of the recent activities as reported in this morning's papers of the Japanese in Shanghai?*

DR. AKAGI: What I think about it is very simple. I told you some of it. I think it is one of those many pinpricking policies of China realized in Shanghai. It is one of the things that have been happening on so many occasions because of which not only Japanese but also Western nations maintain their armed forces in Shanghai.

QUESTION: I would like to address this question to both gentlemen, to Dr. Akagi as well as to Dr. Koo. *Assuming that Japanese rights in Manchuria have been violated, were there not means available of having those rights determined and enforced other than through force of arms?*

DR. KOO: The means to solve them, of course, existed prior to the military action of Japan. Since then, of course, there has been no possibility of negotiation.

DR. AKAGI: I answer in a different way the same thing. Means of negotiation existed, but they refused to negotiate with Japan and to settle them.

QUESTION: Will Professor Chamberlain answer the same question?

PROFESSOR CHAMBERLAIN: It would be obviously impossible for me to add very much to what has already been said. I can only say that where there is a will on both sides, there is a way.

THE CHAIRMAN: This meeting is—I am almost tempted to say degenerating—developing into a contest of epigrams. Now, I wonder if there is a question here which cannot be answered quite so briefly and still will not require a lengthy answer.

QUESTION: I would like to ask Professor Akagi this question: *What is the custom in his honorable country with reference to memorials presented by the incoming Premier to his Emperor. I have in mind the one by Premier Tanaka in July, 1927, where he advocated very clearly and very strongly the prompt and extensive acquisition not only of Manchuria, but of Mongolia, first Korea, then Manchuria, then Mongolia, and where do we go from there?*

DR. AKAGI: The question is with regard to a so-called Tanaka memorial to the Emperor. Until a short time ago when I saw a copy of it in the course of the Kioto Conference of the Pacific Relations, I had heard nothing of it. Later by studying it I discovered that it was not written by a Japanese but by someone else, I know not who wrote it, in order to bring disgrace to Japan, the Japanese nation as well as her people. If some of you will take the trouble to study the content of the memorial, it will disclose the very inexactness of the memorial. You know that criminals no matter how careful they are in their actions always leave certain traces of their footprints through which the legal authorities can trace them down. Well, in this case there are many, many loopholes. For instance, this one: There is a passage where it mentions that Prince Yamagata was at a certain important meeting and said such and such things. Now, if you study the date of the meeting and the life of Prince Yamagata you will see that Prince Yamagata was long dead when that meeting was held! Therefore, my answer is that this memorial, which was circulated all around the world, was written by someone who had some kind of grudge against Japan.

QUESTION: *I would like to ask Mr. Koo why was it that such distinguished and experienced statesmen as the late President of China and Mr. C. T. Wang in their dealings with the Manchurian question seemed to lose the confidence of the people of China?*

Dr. Koo: I think I said in the course of my address that from the very beginning of the trouble in Manchuria there were two divergent opinions in the country. The vocal part of the people said, "Do not take the thing to the League. We must fight it out for ourselves." The Government said, "Japan and China are members of the League, so let us take the matter to the League."

If the League had so acted as to give our Government some basis for the stand they had taken in the matter, perhaps the situation would not have been so bad; but the Chinese people are now saying to their former leaders, "I told you so." That wipes out the confidence they have in those men.

There is also an internal reason in that the political struggle today is against the Kuomintang in its policy of having only one party government in China. You realize that no political progress can come in China quickly until that policy is broken, and there are quite a number of groups that are out to break that policy. President Chiang and C. T. Wang happened to be in the government identified with that one party policy, and so popular opinion turned against them.

Question: *Isn't it true that Japan has taken Korea, and is now in Manchuria, and might be in Mongolia?*

Dr. Akagi: There are three parts in that question: As to Korea, you cannot judge what Japan did in the past with your own ideas of 1932 Judge what Japan did then with the prevailing political ideas of 1910, before the Great War.

Second, Japan is in Manchuria, as I tried to show you, temporarily. As soon as she gets the acceptable guaranty of the treaty rights, she will retire.

As to Mongolia, ask Russians; they have a free republic there.

The Chairman: It is getting a little late to bring the Soviets into this discussion. I think even at a Foreign Policy Association meeting three minutes would hardly be adequate to discuss the Russian interest in Manchuria or Mongolia, so we have just time for one other question.

Question: Our speaker has mentioned the 200,000 Japanese and 800,000 Koreans in Manchuria, who lack tenure of land. *Is it not true that of the 30,000,000 colonists who have gone in from China that perhaps 80 per cent are tenants and not people who have any more fixed tenure of land than either the Koreans or Japanese?*

Dr. Akagi: The only difference is that Japan has a treaty right to lease land which China does not carry out. The Chinese, as citizens of the Chinese Republic, have the right, and if they want to enjoy it they can.

The Chairman: On your behalf I extend our thanks to the three speakers, and declare the meeting adjourned.

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